Monetary theorists have advanced an intriguing notion: we exchange money to make up for a lack of enforcement, when it is difficult to monitor and sanction opportunistic behaviors. We demonstrate that, in fact, monetary equilibrium cannot generally be sustained when monitoring and punishment limitations preclude enforcement-external or not. Simply put, monetary systems cannot operate independently of institutions-formal or informal-designed to monitor behaviors and sanction undesirable ones. This fundamental result is derived by integrating monetary theory with the theory of repeated games, studying monetary equilibrium as the outcome of a matching game with private monitoring.
Introduction
Why do societies rely on money? The traditional view is that monetary systems overcome barter and intertemporal trade frictions [10] . A recent view is that money makes up for a lack of enforcement in society: money has value if, by exchanging it, we outperform equilibria based on rules of voluntary behavior [1, 7, 9] .
To develop this idea, imagine a group of strangers facing repeated opportunities to aid someone else, at a cost. Payoffs are maximized if everyone helps. However, monitoring is difficult, direct reciprocation is impossible, no one can self-commit to actions, and no coercion is possible: any help is voluntary. Establishing a norm of mutual support requires trust that help today will be later returned by strangers, which calls for enforcement of defections [6, 8] . Monetary trade requires none of this-argue monetary theorists: we exchange help for money instead of promises of future help because we cannot monitor and cannot sanction, individually or collectively, opportunistic behavior. What incentives can monetary systems provide that norms of voluntary behavior cannot reproduce?
We answer this question by adopting analysis techniques from the literature on repeated matching games to study monetary exchange. Such methodological innovation allows us to demonstrate that money cannot generally make up for a lack of enforcement (external or not) in society.
In fact, monetary equilibrium collapses if monitoring and punishment limitations hinder individual and group enforcement. In particular, without enforcement of spot trades monetary exchange cannot be sustained in large anonymous economies, i.e., the economies that are the bread and butter of monetary models.
In the model, a stable population of anonymous players is randomly divided in pairs in each period. In every encounter one subject can provide a benefit to the other by sustaining a small cost (= make a voluntary transfer). This interaction is infinitely repeated [3, 4] . Since players cannot build reputations and cannot adopt relational contracts, there is an incentive to behave opportunistically and avoid making transfers. May the introduction of symbolic objects (=tokens) support an outcome that is socially preferred?
Monetary theorists have offered a positive answer by imposing quid-proquo constraints: any transfer requires a concurrent payment, or else it fails.
1
In a simultaneous-moves game this amounts to assuming away any temptation to defect (= give nothing) by imposing mechanical punishment (= get nothing), so if money has value, monetary trade is incentive-compatible by design. Quid-pro-quo is a form of external enforcement: it converts the social dilemma into a coordination game by restricting the outcome set.
1 E.g., see the survey in [10] ; the "no-commitment trading mechanism" in [9] , which embeds a technology that filters out outcomes that are not mutually desirable; the trading mechanism in [1] .
What if we do not restrict outcomes in a match? Agents might not voluntarily deliver their "quid," even if they get the "quo." In sequential equilibrium, such opportunistic behavior must be deterred with proper dynamic incentives. The result that money sustains exchange without enforcement-external or not-is thus overturned. All we need is a sufficiently large economy with poor monitoring; Folk-theorem type results for matching games reveal that even if everyone sanctions a defection by forever defecting, such community enforcement cannot deter opportunistic behavior in large groups [6, 8] .
Our finding that money cannot single-handedly make up for a lack of enforcement in society is unique. It is meaningful because it provides a theoretical foundation for the notion that monetary exchange cannot operate as a stand-alone institution to overcome trade frictions. The option to exchange symbolic objects for goods does not per se remove opportunistic temptations, so monetary trade must be supported by enforcement institutions, formal (=external) or informal. This leads us to hypothesize that the monitoring difficulties due to the growth in size of human settlements over the course of history, might have provided a push towards adoption of monetary exchange in those communities equipped with effective enforcement institutions, and not in societies that lacked such institutions-as current thinking would instead suggest.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and reports the main Theorem, which is proved in Section 3. Section 4 offers some final remarks.
A model of intertemporal exchange
Consider an economy populated by N = 2n ≥ 4 infinitely-lived agents who face a social dilemma [3, 4] . An exogenous matching process partitions the population into n pairs in each period t = 0, 1, . . .. Pairings are random, equally likely, independent over time, and last only one period. Let o i (t) ̸ = i be agent i's opponent (or partner) in period t.
In each pair {i, o i (t)}, a coin flip assigns the role of buyer to one agent, and seller to the other. Hence, in each period an agent is equally likely to either be a seller meeting a buyer, or a buyer meeting a seller. The buyer has no action to take. The seller can choose C or D; C is interpreted voluntarily transferring a good; Figure 1 reports the payoff matrix, where Payoffs in the repeated game are the sum of period-payoffs, discounted by a common factor β ∈ [0, 1). 3 In the repeated game, the efficient outcome corresponds to the one in which total surplus is maximized in each match, and in each period. We call this outcome "gift-giving" because it involves an infinite sequence of unilateral transfers. Otherwise, community enforcement does not represent a sufficient deterrent [6, 8] . So, let us add fiat money to study if its use can solve such enforcement problems.
The game with money
A random fraction m = M N ∈ (0, 1) of agents is initially endowed with one indivisible, intrinsically worthless token. As is standard in the literature, token holdings are observable, and cannot exceed one [1] . The introduction of tokens expands action sets: in addition to others choices he may have, a player with a token must also decide to either keep the token or to give it to his opponent. The left panel in Figure 2 illustrates the game in a monetary match, defined as a meeting where only the buyer has a token. All other meetings are called non-monetary. Players simultaneously choose actions.
Adding tokens does not eliminate any outcomes possible when M = 0:
to see this, consider strategies that ignore tokens, which brings us back to Figure 1 . Adding tokens expands the strategy set. Consider a strategy • There is no exit from the idle condition. 
Monetary equilibrium
Conjecture that monetary trade is an equilibrium. Consider an agent with j = 0, 1 tokens at the start of a period. Define the probability m 0 that someone without money randomly meets a buyer with a token, and the probability 1 − m 1 that someone with money randomly meets a seller with-out a token. Since being a seller or a buyer in a meeting is equally likely, and independent of money holdings, we have
Recursive arguments imply that the start-of-period equilibrium payoff v j
(1)
Proof of Lemma 1. In Appendix β ≥ β m is necessary for existence of monetary equilibrium: payoffs must be above that ensured by permanent autarky
, which is always an equilibrium. However, it is not sufficient because players can suffer involuntary losses. 
Theorem 1 (Existence of monetary equilibrium). There exists
(l * , β * ) ∈ [0, g − d) × (β m , 1) such that for (l, β) ∈ [l * , g − d) × [β * , 1)
Proposition 1 (Monetary equilibrium with external enforcement).

Assume quid-pro-quo. Monetary equilibrium is supported for all
and for any N .
Here, no agent can sustain (in)voluntary losses, so opportunistic behavior is assumed away. That is, some enforcement has been introduced, e.g., an institution that enforces private property rights. So, there is no need for community enforcement and we consider a simple history-independent strategy: in a monetary match, players make transfers (money or goods)
conditional on receiving a concurrent transfer; otherwise sellers choose D, and buyers do not make transfers. Monetary trade is incentive compatible if the seller's loss is small relative to the benefit expected from spending the token in the future. All we need is sufficiently patient players, β ≥ β m ;
see [1] .
The rest of the paper constructs the proof of Theorem 1 by studying the incentives to make voluntary transfers in equilibrium (=cooperate) and to punish off equilibrium (=defect). We start by studying how punishment spreads off equilibrium, and proceed by calculating off-equilibrium payoffs.
Off-equilibrium punishment and payoffs
Consider the start of an arbitrary period t in which the economy is or goes It can be shown that, in this case, the probability distribution of defec- it is convenient to proceed by considering the probability of each possible
Q kk ′ is the probability of reaching k ′ starting from k ≥ 2.
We construct v 0 (k), the payoff to defector i when he has no money at the start of date t. Consider any outcome in t leading to k ′ ≥ k defectors in the continuation game. Focus on a match between defector i and o i (t).
Conditional on k ′ being the state on t + 1 and k being the state on t, let α 0 kk ′ denote the probability that, on date t, o i (t) is a cooperating buyer with money when i has no money (the 0 superscript). 
a cooperator when everyone is a defector). In addition, since
for all k (which we show later), we also have
The payoff to someone who has no money and defects in equilibrium is
which follows from the fact that Q 12 = 1 and α 
The second line above follows from observing that-when there are k defectors in the economy-the unconditional probability that i (who has a token) is in a monetary match with a cooperating seller is
We have σ k ≥ σ h if h ≥ k (with more defectors, meeting cooperators is less likely).
It is convenient to define σ 1 = 1 and the vector
For k ≥ 2, each element σ k defines the probability that buyer i is in a monetary match and meets a cooperator, given that i is one of k defectors at the start of a period. It should be clear that 0
as the payoff to a buyer who is in monetary match in equilibrium, and defects. Define
Following [5] , it can be interpreted as the expected number of cooperators without money that a defector with money meets in the continuation game, normalized by (1 − β) −1 .
Lemma 2. We have
with v 1 (k) non-increasing in k and lim
The proof immediately follows from [5, Theorem 2]. Having characterized payoffs in and out of equilibrium, we can now study deviations in and out of equilibrium.
Equilibrium deviations
Suppose everyone has been active until period t and in period t + 1 agent i deviates, reverting to play the monetary trade strategy on t + 2. Agent i meets cooperator o i (t) who may or may not have money.
In a non-monetary match, player i does not deviate by making a transfer. Doing so is suboptimal because i has a loss but no future gain (continuation payoffs do not change because his opponent remains active). Hence, consider a monetary match in equilibrium. Two cases may occur:
• i has no money and o i (t) is a buyer with money. If i deviates by choosing D, then i receives money and his opponent becomes idle.
Such deviation is suboptimal if
• i has money and o i (t) is a seller without money. If i keeps his token, then he obtains g and o i (t) becomes idle. Such deviation is subopti-
Lemma 3 (No deviations in equilibrium).
There exists a value β * < 1 such that (6)- (7) hold for all β ∈ [β * , 1).
Proof of Lemma 3.
In Appendix.
The proof of the Lemma reveals that the key participation constraint is the buyer's. In equilibrium, if the buyer pays a seller -which occurs if β is sufficiently large -then it is also true that the seller serves the buyer.
The reverse, however, is not true.
Lemma 4 (Large economies). Monetary trade is not an equilibrium as
Proof of Lemma 4. In Appendix.
Intuitively, in large economies buyers prefer to avoid paying because they can immediately consume, cannot be immediately punished, and can spend their money in the future. This destroys the value of money. The conclusion is that monetary equilibrium cannot generally be sustained when monitoring and punishment limitations preclude adequate enforcementexternal or not. This is true for the same reason it is true for social norms:
in equilibrium individuals voluntarily sustain a loss to provide a benefit to others only if group punishment is a significant threat. In the next section,
we study the credibility of the threat, by considering the incentives to punish off-equilibrium.
Off-equilibrium deviations
Community enforcement is credible if actions in the punishment phase are individually optimal. Deviating in non-monetary matches is suboptimal (the deviator has a loss and cannot slow down contagion). However, a defector might wish to deviate in a monetary match, to slow down the contagious spread of punishment. We study this case.
Suppose there are k ≥ 2 defectors, and agent i is one of them. Letv j (k) denote i's payoff when he has j = 0, 1 tokens. Deviating is suboptimal if
To derive these continuation payoffs, consider that the expected payoffs from not punishing depend on the probabilities of meeting a defector with and without money. 
Similarly, consider defector i when he has money. Let µ 1 kk ′ denote the conditional probability that o i (t) is a seller without money, and δ 1 kk ′ the probability that o i (t) is a defecting seller without money. Hence, we have
Using a recursive formulation, we havê
To derive these expressions note that i deviates only in a monetary match.
If i has no money, then we considerv 0 (k). The first line accounts for the cases in which i is in a monetary match (i.e., a seller). Here, the agent earns d − l because he cooperates instead of punishing. Player i might also receive money, but this depends on whether his opponent (who is a buyer with money) cooperates or defects. If his opponent is a cooperator, then i's continuation payoff is v 1 (k ′ − 1), because this cooperator does not become a defector (i cooperates) and gives money to i. Otherwise, we have
because there is no impact on the number of future defectors and i does not receive money.
The second line defines matches in which i is not in a monetary match.
The probability of not meeting a buyer with money can be decomposed as
because, conditional on transitioning from k to k ′ , the probability of not 
by manipulating expressions v 1 (k) andv 1 (k) and using the fact that α
Lemma 5 (Buyers punish). Inequality (8) holds for all β ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 5. In Appendix.
Out of equilibrium, it is never optimal for a buyer to deviate from the punishment strategy. The reason is simple. Suppose buyer i today pays the seller, when in fact he should not. Paying the seller may slow down the growth in the number of defectors but agent i cannot benefit from it until he re-acquires money. Hence, since future payoffs are discounted, it is a dominant strategy to not pay out of equilibrium.
Deviating from punishment in a monetary match is suboptimal for de-
Lemma 6 (Sellers punish). There exists 0 ≤ l
, then inequality (9) holds for all β ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 6. In Appendix
Out of equilibrium, cooperating as a seller may slow down the growth in defectors. This benefits the seller because he acquires money and may be able to spend it tomorrow. To remove the incentive to deviate, the seller's loss from making a unilateral transfer must be sufficiently high. [3, 4] .
Final remarks
Hence,
Using the definition of v 0 in (1) we have
Now, consider deviations by a seller in a monetary match. Inequality
From the definition of v 0 and v 1 in (1) we have (6) is also satisfied when β ∈ [β * , 1).
Proof of Lemma 4.
We have to simply show that buyers do not wish to pay in economies that are "large." To define a large economy, let M = bN for b ∈ (0, 1) and let N → ∞. That is, we fix a per-capita money supply and let the economy grow large.
Consider a defector who is a buyer in a monetary match, out of equilibrium when there are k ≥ 2 defectors. Since the number of defectors is finite, the unconditional probability that the buyer is in a monetary match with a seller who is a cooperator is lim
where (I − βQ) 
Proof of Lemma 5. We prove by contradiction that
in (2) and notice that v j (k) ≥ v j (k+1) for j = 0, 1 and all k = 2, . . . , N −1.
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We have
which provides the desired contradiction because
Consider inequality (8) . We prove that it holds whenever
To derive the second line we have used the fact that α
For the third line note that α 0 kk ′ ≤ 1. The fourth line follows
Q kk ′ = v 1 (k + 1)(1 − Q kk ).
Since
we have 
We wish to prove that β(ϕ 1 − ϕ 2 ) 1 − β < 1, hence a value l * < g − d exists, which satisfies (9) . From equation (5) in Lemma 2 we have
By definition of v 1 (1), we also have
where we have used equation (5) for v 1 (2) . Hence, we must have
which is rewritten as ϕ 1 − βϕ 2 1 − β = σ 1 .
Recall that σ 1 = 1 (if there is only one defector, then the defector meets a cooperator with certainty) and β(ϕ 1 − ϕ 2 ) < ϕ 1 − βϕ 2 , hence β(ϕ 1 − ϕ 2 ) 1 − β <
1.
Finally, note that inequality (9) is the most stringent when k = 2, and in this case it can be rewritten as 
